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Death Penalty Law
by Michael Mears*
and
Holly Geerdes**
This Article surveys the death penalty decisions of the Georgia
Supreme Court from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003.' The cases
discussed include those heard by the supreme court on interim appeal,
on direct appeal, and on review of habeas corpus decisions. Focusing on
the court's decisions that affect the trial and appeal of death penalty
cases, this Article, with some exceptions, does not discuss holdings in
capital cases that are common to all criminal appeals. Four recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are included in this
survey because of their salience to Georgia death penalty law.
I.

PRETRIAL ISSUES

This section covers issues involving indictment, grand juries, search
and seizure, discovery, and change of venue.
A.

Indictment
Appellant in Sallie v. State2 was first indicted in 1990 by a Bacon
County grand jury for murder and various other charges. Sallie was
subsequently tried and convicted on all counts except armed robbery and
theft by taking. The supreme court reversed appellant's convictions in

* Director of the Georgia Multi-County Public Defender since 1992. Mississippi State
University (B.S., 1968; M.A., 1969); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1977).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Senior Appellate Attorney of the Georgia Multi-County Public Defender. University
of Iowa (B.A., 1996); University of Minnesota Law School (J.D., 2000). Member, State Bar
of Georgia. The Authors of this Article would like to acknowledge the research and writing
assistance of Caneel Fraser, J.D. class 2005, Harvard Law School.
1. For a survey of death penalty decisions handed down during the prior year, see
Michael Mears, Death Penalty Law, 54 MERCER L. REV. 245 (2002).
2. 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003).
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1998 and returned his case to Bacon County.3 At the State's request,
appellant's indictment was nolle prossed, only to have a Bacon County
grand jury reindict Sallie less than six months later on the same
offenses (excluding theft by taking and armed robbery). Appellant filed
a motion to quash the second indictment, arguing that the State was
required to charge exceptions to the statute of limitations for all of the
nonmurder charges due to the time lapsed since the commission of those
crimes, but the trial court denied appellant's motion.4 Stating that
section 17-3-3 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A") 5
provides for a six-month extension when an indictment brought within
the statute of limitations is later nolle prossed, not an exception to the
statute of limitations that must be pleaded in the indictment, the court
held that "the State may re-indict a defendant within six months after
the first indictment is nolle prossed without running afoul of the statute
7
of limitation even if the initial statute of limitation period has run."
At trial, appellant in Braley v.State8 was found guilty of malice
murder, felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery,
and aggravated battery, and was sentenced to death after a jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed while
appellant was engaged in the commission of other statutory aggravators.
Appealing this sentence, Braley argued that the trial court erred in
denying each of his motions to quash various charges in his indictment.9
While the issue of error surrounding two of the specified charges was
declared moot,' ° the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to
quash the remaining counts."
The court held that the count of
kidnapping with bodily injury and the count of armed robbery each
placed appellant on sufficient notice of the charges against him,'2 and
that the Georgia statutes defining each of those crimes were not
unconstitutionally vague.' 3 The court also held that O.C.G.A. section
16-5-40' 4 is not unconstitutional on the ground that it may serve as the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 453.
Id. at 506-13, 578 S.E.2d at 444-53.
O.C.G.A. § 17-3-3 (1997).
276 Ga. at 513-14, 578 S.E.2d at 453.
Id. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 453.
276 Ga. 47, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002).
Id. at 47-49, 572 S.E.2d at 588-90.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12.
13.
14.

Id. (citing Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 103, 475 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1996)).
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 590.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40 (1999).
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basis for a death sentence in cases in which the kidnapping results in
the death of the victim. 15
Similarly, the court in Sallie upheld the trial court's denial of
appellant's motions to dismiss various statutory aggravating circumstances from his indictment. 16 Finding no error in the trial court's
refusal to dismiss the statutory aggravating circumstance based on the
commission of a burglary, the court explained that Sallie's claim of
authority to enter the family home of his estranged wife was not
supported by law.'7 The court also upheld the trial court's determination that the count of the indictment alleging "an assault upon the
person of [the victim] with a pistol, a deadly weapon, by shooting said
[victim] with said pistol,"" was sufficient to charge the elements of
aggravated assault. 9 Sallie argued that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the two statutory aggravating circumstances related to his
commission of murder while engaged in the commission of kidnappings
with bodily injury to two victims distinct from the murder victim,
claiming that the kidnappings with bodily injury occurred several hours
after the murder.2" Finding no error on the part of the trial court, the
court stated, "[t]he O.C.G.A. [section] 17-10-30(b)(2) aggravating
circumstance does not require simultaneity of action between the murder
and the other capital felony or aggravated battery."2' Noting that the
murder and kidnappings occurred within a "relatively short period of
time,"22 the court held that these acts "can be fairly viewed as one
continuous course of criminal conduct"23 and stated that O.C.G.A.
section 17-10-30(b)(2) does not require the victim of the murder and the
kidnapping to be the same person.24

15. 276 Ga. at 49,572 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 841, 514 S.E.2d
426, 434 (1999)).
16. 276 Ga. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 453-54.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 515, 578 S.E.2d at 454.
19. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) (2003); Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 464 S.E.2d
198 (1995); Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. App. 718, 455 S.E.2d 615 (1995)).
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 214, 305 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1983); Strickland
v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 230-31, 275 S.E.2d 29,40 (1981); Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 431, 238
S.E.2d 12, 19-20 (1977)); see O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (1997 & Supp. 2002).
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Romine, 251 Ga. at 208, 305 S.E.2d at 93).
24. Id. (citing Peek, 239 Ga. at 431, 238 S.E.2d at 19-20; Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110,
115, 416 S.E.2d 78, 82-83 (1992)).
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Grand Jury

In Smith v. State,25 the defendant was charged with malice murder
and other crimes. 26 The supreme court granted defendant's application
for interim review to address the trial court's ruling on defendant's Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section challenges to the Hall County grand and
traverse jury lists. 27 The trial court ruled against defendant on his
challenge to the grand jury list and in favor of defendant on his
challenge to the traverse jury list. 28 Applying the three-part test it
established in Morrow v. State2 9 for determining the existence of a
prima facie Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation, the court
upheld the lower court's ruling on the grand jury list challenge,
condoning the use of 1990 census numbers to create the 2000 grand jury
list, and reversed its ruling on the traverse jury list challenge.3" While
the court held that defendant had satisfied his burden under the first
prong of the Morrow test by establishing that Hispanics are a cognizable
class for Sixth Amendment challenges,3 1 the court also held that Smith
had not met his burden on the second prong because Smith failed to
show an actionable disparity between the percentage of Hispanics on the
traverse jury list and the percentage of jury-eligible, not just resident,
Hispanics in the county.3" The court held that Smith established no
"inherent exclusion" in Hall County's jury selection process, thereby
failing the third prong of the Morrow test.33 The jury commissioners
had attempted sporadically to recruit eligible Hispanics, albeit unsuccessfully.34

25. 275 Ga. 715, 571 S.E.2d 740 (2002).
26. Id. at 715, 571 S.E.2d at 742.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000). The court in Morrow stated that
To prevail on a Sixth Amendment jury pool composition challenge, Morrow must
show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in jury pools is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3)
that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury selection process.
Id. at 692, 532 S.E.2d at 82 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); Bowen v.
Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 684 (11th Cir. 1985)).
30. 275 Ga. at 718-19, 726, 571 S.E.2d at 744-45, 749.
31. Id. at 718, 571 S.E.2d at 744.
32. Id. at 723, 571 S.E.2d at 747.
33. Id. at 725, 571 S.E.2d at 748.
34. Id., 571 S.E.2d at 748-49.
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Appellant in Ramirez v. State35 was indicted in DeKalb County on
one count of malice murder, one count of felony murder, two counts of
aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and one count of
carrying a concealed weapon.3" On interim review, the supreme court
denied Ramirez's motion to quash his indictment based on underrepresentation of African Americans and Hispanics on the grand jury.3 7
Citing its decision in Smith," the court held that Ramirez's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim regarding the underrepresentation
of African Americans failed because DeKalb County complied with the
Unified Appeal Procedure and because Ramirez failed to show that the
grand jury selection procedure was "susceptible of abuse or was not
racially neutral." 9 The court held that Ramirez established a prima
facie case of a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation by showing
an 11.9 percent underrepresentation of African Americans on the grand
jury source list.4 ° However, the court found that Ramirez's showing
was successfully rebutted by the State. 4 ' Complying with the Unified
Appeal Procedure by using the most recent census data to obtain
"comprehensiveness and objectivity in the DeKalb County jury selection
process" was a strong enough state interest to defeat Ramirez's claim of
underrepresentation of African Americans.42 Because the burden was
on Ramirez to prove "actual under-representation of Hispanic persons,"43 the court held that Ramirez's showing of inadequate tracking
of Hispanics by the county jury commissioners did not itself suffice to
present a prima facie case of either an equal protection or fair crosssection violation."
Ruling against the appellant's Sixth Amendment challenge, the
supreme court in Lawler v. State4' held that Lawler failed to establish
a fair cross-section violation regarding the Fulton County grand and
traverse jury lists used in his case. 4' The court emphasized that there

35. 276 Ga. 158, 575 S.E.2d 462 (2003).
36. Id. at 158, 575 S.E.2d at 464.
37. Id. at 163, 575 S.E.2d at 468.
38. Smith, 275 Ga. at 715, 571 S.E.2d at 740 (holding that the trial court did not err
in finding no equal protection violation when a grand jury source list in a 2000 indictment
was based on 1990 census data).
39. 276 Ga. at 160-61,575 S.E.2d at 466 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,493
(1977)).
40. Id. at 162, 575 S.E.2d at 467.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 276 Ga. 229, 576 S.E.2d 841 (2003).
46. Id. at 231, 576 S.E.2d at 845.
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is no constitutional guarantee that an impaneled jury will be a
representative cross-section of the community and that, rather, such an
inquiry focuses on whether the procedures for compiling the jury lists
are fair.4 7
The court in Sallie held that appellant failed to prove the systematic
exclusion of disabled persons from the Bacon County grand jury.4"
Stating that Sallie's use of anecdotal evidence to establish exclusion was
insufficient, the court also held that Sallie failed to prove that the
physically disabled are a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment
analysis.4 9 The court found no legitimate equal protection claim
because "[u]nlike race or gender, disability may legitimately affect a
person's ability to serve as a juror." ' °
The court also dealt with the issue of grand juror qualification in
Sallie.5 1 Appellant protested that some of the grand jurors who
indicted him were aware of his previous trial and convictions.52 The
supreme court noted that a person is hot disqualified to serve on a grand
jury because they have "heard or read about the case under investigation
or ha[ve] even formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the
accused.""3 The court held that any such possible error in Sallie's
indictment was harmless as the "trial jury's verdict of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt4 demonstrates that there was probable cause to charge
5
the defendant."
C.

Search and Seizure

In Lawler appellant sought to suppress evidence allegedly obtained
through an illegal stop and multiple illegal searches.55 The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's denials of Lawler's suppression motions.56 Dismissing appellant's claim of an illegal stop by police officers
in a parking lot before the commission of the murder, the court found
that the evidence showed that appellant was "neither stopped nor

47. Id. at 231-32, 576 S.E.2d at 845 (citing Torres v. State, 272 Ga. 389,391, 529 S.E.2d
883, 885 (2000)).
48. 276 Ga. at 511, 578 S.E.2d at 451 (citing Smith, 275 Ga. at 715, 571 S.E.2d at 740;
Morrow, 272 Ga. at 691, 532 S.E.2d at 78).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 512,578 S.E.2d at 451-52 (quoting United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870,875
(7th Cir. 1999)).
51. Id. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 453.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 719, 386 S.E.2d 316, 321 (1989)).
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. 276 Ga. at 232-33, 576 S.E.2d at 846.
56. Id. at 232, 576 S.E.2d at 846.
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detained."57 The court held that the warrantless searches of appellant's
apartment and its surroundings conducted during and immediately after
an armed standoff between Lawler and police at Lawler's home were
justified based on the exigency of the circumstances. 58
Despite Lawler's claim that a warrant issued for "guns, ammunition,
clothing, shoes, and other related items to the crime of murder" was
without sufficient particularity, the court held that the warrant was
valid, and the evidence seized was admissible. 9 Books and pamphlets
on police and military subjects discovered during a warrant search of
Lawler's apartment were held not to be improperly seized "private
papers." 0 The court further held that the admission of these documents at trial was not a violation of Lawler's free speech rights because
the First Amendment does "not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to
establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent."61 A
search of Lawler's person at the police station, which included swabbing
for blood or gunshot residue, was found to be a lawful search incident to
Lawler's arrest.6 2 Ruling against Lawler's claim that the magistrate
who issued the search warrants was not "neutral and detached," the
court concluded that
the magistrate's limited social contacts with the affiants, his visit to (one of the
victim police officers] after her injuries, and his attendance at [the other victim's]
funeral, did not compromise the "severance and disengagement from activities of
law enforcement" required of a magistrate in order to issue a valid search

warrant.'

The court declined appellate review of Lawler's contention that the
second search warrant in his case was invalid, stating that the evidence
Lawler contended was seized pursuant to the second warrant was
actually validly seized under the first warrant.'
A third search of
Lawler's apartment was executed after Lawler's live-in girlfriend
informed police of further hidden weapons. Before conducting this

57. Id. at 232-33, 576 S.E.2d at 846.
58. Id. at 233, 576 S.E.2d at 846 (citing Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 230, 367 S.E.2d
806 (1988), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978)).
59. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 846-47 (citing McBee v. State, 228 Ga. App. 16, 491 S.E.2d 97
(1997); Miller v. State, 219 Ga. App. 213, 464 S.E.2d 621 (1995)).
60. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 847 (citing Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805, 426 S.E.2d 553 (1993)
(holding that "private papers" are those documents protected by a legal privilege)).
61. Id. at 234, 576 S.E.2d at 847 (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489
(1993)).
62. Id. (citing Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997); Strickland, 247
Ga. at 219, 275 S.E.2d at 29).
63. Id. (citing Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997); King v. State,
263 Ga. 741, 438 S.E.2d 620 (1994)).

64. Id.
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search, police obtained the girlfriend's consent and a new search
warrant. 5 The court dismissed appellant's objections to the admission
of evidence found during this third search, holding that the search for
and seizure of these weapons were legal under both a valid warrant and
a valid consent.6
Likewise, the court in Sallie held that the two warrants issued to
search appellant's mobile home and automobile, respectively, were each
supported by probable cause and were therefore valid.6 7 Without
elaboration, the court also held that the warrant to search the mobile
home did not authorize a "general search," the police did not exceed the
scope of the warrant in searching the mobile home, and thus, all of the
evidence seized was admissible at trial.6 6
D. Discovery
In Braley the appellant filed a motion for funds to obtain the services
of a neuropsychologist. After the trial court's denial of this motion,
appellant was convicted of malice murder and other charges, and the
jury recommended a death sentence.69 Noting that appellant was
previously examined by a defense-selected, court-funded psychiatrist, the
supreme court found no error in the trial court's denial of such funds
because appellant was "unable to demonstrate that the services of a
neuropsychologist were 'critical' to his defense.""
E.

Change of Venue
In Terrell v. State,"' the trial court determined that pretrial publicity
prevented appellant from getting a fair trial in Newton County, where
the murder occurred. Because the parties could not reach an agreement,
the court selected Houston County as the transfer county. After a
mistrial in Houston County, the court sua sponte transferred venue to

65. Id. at 234-35, 576 S.E.2d at 847.
66. Id. at 235, 576 S.E.2d at 847 (citing DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E.2d 157
(1997); Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 587, 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995)).
67. 276 Ga. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 453 (citing Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 20-22, 560
S.E.2d 663, 675 (2002) (holding that each of the searches appellant protested were lawful
because there was sufficient evidence for the judge to find probable cause and the searches
were sufficiently limited in scope); DeYoung, 268 Ga. 780, 786-89, 493 S.E.2d 157, 165
(affirming the validity of four search warrants that appellant challenged by arguing lack
of sufficient evidence of probable cause)).
68. Id. (citing Lance, 275 Ga. at 20-22, 560 S.E.2d at 663).
69. 276 Ga. at 47, 50, 572 S.E.2d at 588-90.
70. Id. at 50, 572 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 41, 365 S.E.2d
115, 117 (1988)).
71. 276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002).
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Walton County on the grounds of convenience, similarity in the
demographics of the two counties, and limited circulation of the primary
Newton County newspaper in Walton County. In Walton County,
appellant was convicted of malice murder and received a death
sentence.7 2 On appeal the supreme court held that Terrell's allegation
of prejudice, because of the four percent difference between the African
American populations of Walton and Newton Counties was without
merit.73 Also noting that voir dire demonstrated that no prospective
jurors knew about Terrell's case, the court concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in transferring the case to Walton County
because there was no prejudice to appellant.'
II. JURY SELECTION
This section covers the permissible scope of examination, challenges
for cause, and peremptory challenges during juror selection.
A.

Scope of Examination

In Terrell v. State,7 5 appellant argued that the trial court erred in
preventing him from asking certain voir dire questions to prospective
jurors.7" The supreme court found that some of the contested questions
"improperly called for prejudgment of the case or asked prospective
jurors what sentences were appropriate in hypothetical cases,"77 while
others were "irrelevant to a determination of the prospective jurors'
impartiality."78 Noting that the trial court has discretion in determining the scope of voir dire, the Georgia Supreme Court found that Terrell
was permitted to ask sufficient questions to determine the fairness of
prospective jurors, thereby finding no error.79
Citing again the trial court's discretion in determining voir dire's
scope, the court in Lawler v. State ° noted that "it is not error for the
trial court to exclude voir dire questions that do not deal directly with
the juror's responsibilities in the case."8 ' The court in Lawler held that

72.
73.
221-22
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 34, 44, 572 S.E.2d at 598, 604.
Id. at 44, 572 S.E.2d at 604 (citing Gary v. State, 260 Ga. 38, 41, 389 S.E.2d 218,
(1990)).
Id. (citing Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 285-86, 498 S.E.2d 502, 508-09 (1998)).
276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002).
Id. at 37-38, 572 S.E.2d at 600.
Id. at 38, 572 S.E.2d at 600 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (citing Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 351-52, 496 S.E.2d 674, 683 (1998)).
276 Ga. 229, 576 S.E.2d 841 (2003).
Id. at 235, 576 S.E.2d at 848 (citations omitted).
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the trial court committed no error in disallowing appellant to ask a
prospective juror who worked in the healthcare industry: "As a medical
professional, do you have an 2ethical objection to medical professionals
participating in executions?"
Similarly, in Spickler v. State3 the court found no error in the trial
court's denial of appellant's attempt to question prospective jurors about
their views of the parole board, the meaning of parole, distinctions
between the two nondeath sentencing options, and the length of time a
person sentenced to life in prison may actually serve. 4 Citing the
parameters of acceptable voir dire questioning about nondeath sentenc3
the court found the
ing options established in Zellmer v. State,"
questions in the instant case exceeded the scope of inquiry permitted.8 6
The court in Sallie v. State87 commented that "[qluestions of a
technical legal nature and questions that call for prejudgement are
improper in a voir dire examination,"8 8 and found that the trial court
did not improperly restrict appellant's voir dire questions about technical
and legal issues. 9 In Braley v. State,9 ° however, appellant objected
to voir dire questioning that "accurately described the function of
statutory aggravating circumstances and encouraged the prospective
jurors to look at [appellant] as they considered whether they could
confirm their selection of a death sentence."9 ' The court found that the
trial court did not err in overruling appellant's objections, stating that
there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in controlling the scope
of voir dire.92
B.

Challenges for Cause

Appellant in Sallie argued error in the trial court's refusal to excuse
two prospective jurors for cause because of the jurors' bias in favor of the

82. Id.
83. 276 Ga. 164, 575 S.E.2d 482 (2003).
84. Id. at 165, 575 S.E.2d at 485.
85. 272 Ga. 735, 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000) (holding that parties are statutorily entitled,
under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, to question jurors about their inclinations toward parole that
may bias their ability to perform their official duties, but that examination regarding
parole should be limited to a juror's ability to consider both a life sentence with the
possibility of parole and a life sentence without the possibility of parole).
86. 276 Ga. at 165, 575 S.E.2d at 485.
87. 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003).
88. Id. at 510, 578 S.E.2d at 450 (citations omitted).
89. Id.
90. 276 Ga. 47, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002).
91. Id. at 52, 572 S.E.2d at 591-92 (citations omitted).
92. Id. (citing Barnes, 269 Ga. at 351-52, 496 S.E.2d at 674).
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death penalty."3 Stating that "[w]hether to strike a juror for cause is
within the discretion of the trial court and the trial court's rulings are
proper absent some manifest abuse of discretion,"94 the supreme court
examined the two jurors' voir dire responses as a whole, and found no
abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying appellant's motions to
excuse either juror for cause.95 Appellant also argued that it was error
for the trial court to excuse four other prospective jurors for cause.96
Of these four individuals, one juror stated that his religion did not
permit him to sit in judgment of others; two jurors indicated they could
never vote for the death penalty; and the fourth juror had mental health
problems.97 The court's review of the record found no error in the trial
court's determination that these four jurors were not qualified. 8
In Arevalo v. State,99 appellant challenged the trial court's excusal for
cause of two prospective jurors who equivocated about their ability to
vote for a death sentence and a third juror who indicated an inability to
put aside his personal beliefs in order to follow the court's instructions.100 Appellant also challenged the trial court's failure to excuse six
jurors who "initially expressed their personal beliefs in support of the
death penalty" or who indicated they would vote for death in the case of
a guilty verdict. 10 ' The supreme court stated, "[tihere is no requirement that a prospective juror's qualification or disqualification appear
with unmistakable clarity."'0 2 Noting the deference that must be paid
to such trial court findings, the court found no abuse of discretion in the
determinations regarding any of the nine jurors in questrial court's
3
0

tion. 1

The court again cited its duty to defer to the trial court's determinations of juror qualification or disqualification in Braley, finding no error
in the trial court's excusal of five prospective jurors due to their
"inability or unwillingness to consider a death sentence. " ",
Appellant in Spickler alleged that the trial court erred in declining to
strike for cause two jurors: one whose wife had recently witnessed a

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

276 Ga. at 508, 578 S.E.2d at 449.
Id. (quoting Greene v. State, 268 Ga. 47, 50, 485 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 510, 578 S.E.2d at 450.
Id., 578 S.E.2d at 450-51.
Id. at 510-11, 578 S.E.2d at 451.
275 Ga. 392, 567 S.E.2d 303 (2002).
Id. at 393-94, 567 S.E.2d at 306.
Id. at 394, 567 S.E.2d at 306.
Id.
Id. at 394-95, 567 S.E.2d at 306-07.
276 Ga. at 50-51, 572 S.E.2d at 591.
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bank robbery and one who expressed doubt about the presumption of
innocence. 105 Noting the two jurors' statements indicating their ability
to put aside their emotions and initial doubt, respectively, the court
stated that neither of the jurors held a "fixed and definite opinion of
appellant's guilt or innocence that would have prevented them from
adjudicating appellant's case based solely upon the evidence and the
trial court's jury charge." ° The court found no error by the trial court
in declining to strike these jurors for cause.'
The court in Lawler also found no error in the trial court's denial of
Lawler's motions to excuse thirteen jurors for cause.' 8 First clarifying
that Lawler did not move to excuse for cause one of these thirteen jurors,
the court held that there was no error by the trial court in not excusing
the juror sua sponte.'0 9 The court also held that two other jurors from
this group of thirteen were excused for medical reasons before jury
selection began, rendering Lawler's argument with respect to these two
jurors moot."0
Stating that the responses of the remaining ten
challenged jurors to voir dire questions "manifested that their views on
capital punishment would not 'prevent or substantially impair the
performance of [their] duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their]
instructions and [their] oath[s], '""' the court held that the trial court
did not err in declining to disqualify the ten jurors. 112 While certain
jurors had been exposed to limited pretrial news reports, the court held
that these jurors, who made statements indicating their ability to set
aside this previous exposure and base their verdicts on evidence
presented in the courtroom, were not disqualified." 3 The court also
found no error in the denial of Lawler's motions to excuse three jurors
for hardship reasons, mistakenly checking boxes on the juror questionnaire, and personal views on alcohol." 4
In Hinely v. State,"5 appellant argued that three jurors should have
been excused because of their views on the death penalty."6 The

105. 276 Ga. at 165-66, 575 S.E.2d at 485.
106. Id. at 166, 575 S.E.2d at 485.
107. Id.
108. 276 Ga. at 235, 576 S.E.2d at 848.
109. Id. (citing Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646, 501 S.E.2d 219 (1998)).
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Greene, 268 Ga. at 48, 485 S.E.2d at 743 (1997), Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780, 514 S.E.2d 205 (1999)).
114. Id.
115. 275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002).
116. Id. at 783, 573 S.E.2d at 73.
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supreme court held this irrelevant as a ground for reversal because
Hinely received a sentence of life in prison without parole. 117 The
general constitutionality of qualifyingjurors because of their views about
the death penalty, however, was confirmed by the court in both
Arevalo1 5 and Braley."9
Dealing with juror dismissal, the court in Lawler found no error in the
trial court's dismissal of a prospective juror for tardiness. 2 ° After
waiting hours for the juror in question to appear, the trial court
dismissed the juror over appellant's objection and began jury selection.121 Citing Herring v. State2 2 and the inconvenience caused by
the juror's tardiness, the court found that the trial court acted reasonably and without error. 23
C. Peremptory Challenges
Appellant in Sallie claimed that the State employed racial and gender
discrimination in exercising its peremptory strikes. 24 The supreme
court found that the reasons offered for the State's strikes-that all but
one of the jurors whom were struck were reluctant to vote for death and
that the remaining struck juror ministered to inmates-were supported
by the voir dire record and were gender and race neutral. 25 The court
held that the State had sufficiently rebutted a "prima facie case of
discrimination "12s under J.E.B. v. Alabama 1 7 and Batson v. Kentucky. 128
Likewise, the court in Spickler rejected appellant's Batson challenge
to the State's striking of three prospective African American jurors. 29
Finding no error, the court stated that appellant failed to show

117. Id. (citing Beasley v. State, 269 Ga. 620, 625, 502 S.E.2d 235, 240 (1998); Turner
v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 217, 486 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1997)).
118. 275 Ga. at 395, 576 S.E.2d at 307 (citing DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 790, 493
S.E.2d 157, 167 (1997)).
119. 276 Ga. at 52, 572 S.E.2d at 592 (citing DeYoung, 268 Ga. at 790, 493 S.E.2d at
167).
120. 276 Ga. at 236, 576 S.E.2d at 848.
121. Id.
122. 224 Ga. App. 809,481 S.E.2d 842 (1997) (holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in removing a juror who was late for jury duty and replacing him with an
alternate juror).
123. 276 Ga. at 236, 576 S.E.2d at 848.
124. 276 Ga. at 511, 578 S.E.2d at 451.
125. Id. (citing Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 498 S.E.2d 502 (1998)).
126. Id.
127. 511 U.S. 127 (1984).
128. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
129. 276 Ga. at 166, 575 S.E.2d at 485.
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purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of the strikes and that
the State provided race-neutral justifications for the strikes.' °
III.

GUILT AND INNOCENCE

This section discusses custodial statements, victim impact evidence,
evidence of prior difficulties, hearsay, and demonstrative evidence;
sufficiency of evidence; cross-examination; jury charges; merger of
offenses; and mistrial.
A.

Admissibility

1. Appellant's Custodial Statements. Appealing his convictions
of malice murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, and burglary, appellant
in White v. State'13 alleged error in the trial court's admission of his
two custodial statements. 132 The trial court determined the first statement, made by appellant in a police vehicle at the scene of the crime,
was inadmissible under Jackson v. Denno,3 3 and the supreme court
affirmed.'
Evaluating the admissibility of appellant's second
custodial statement, the court noted that White, a high school graduate,
was advised of his rights and signed a waiver form.1"5 The court
concluded that the second statement was given absent any hope of
benefit
and was therefore freely and voluntarily made and admissi13 6
ble.
In Braley v. State,'3 7 the trial court admitted appellant's statement
made at the time of his arrest in which he stated, "[Y]ou've got me, take
me in."13 The court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in
finding the statement "more probative than unduly prejudicial," and
therefore admissible. 139

130. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 271 Ga. 323,324,519 S.E.2d 232,233 (1999); Thomas
v. State, 274 Ga. 156, 161, 549 S.E.2d 359, 367 (2001)).
131. 275 Ga. 678, 571 S.E.2d 786 (2002).
132. Id. at 679, 571 S.E.2d at 787.
133. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
134. 275 Ga. at 679-80, 571 S.E.2d at 788.
135. Id. at 680, 571 S.E.2d at 788.
136. Id.
137. 276 Ga. 47, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002).
138. Id. at 52, 572 S.E.2d at 592.
139. Id. (citing Pickren v. State, 272 Ga. 421, 425, 530 S.E.2d 464, 468 (2000); Carroll
v. State, 261 Ga. 553, 554, 408 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1991)).
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2. Victim Impact Evidence. In Sallie v. State,'14 appellant
argued that testimony by victims describing how the victims freed
themselves and sought help while fearing the return of appellant was
victim impact evidence and impermissible at the guilt-innocence phase
of trial.'
The court found the testimony relevant and admissible, 42
stating that "[a]cts and circumstances forming a part or continuation of
the main transaction are admissible as res gestae." 14
3. Prior Difficulties. Appellant in Sallie argued error in the
admission of evidence of prior difficulties between appellant and the
murder victim, as well as between appellant and the kidnapping victim
(the murder victim's daughter).'" The court found that this evidence
was admissible "to show [appellant's] bent of mind and motive,"' 4 the
State was not required to provide pretrial notice of this evidence, and
the jury was instructed properly on the limited use of this evidence." 4
4. Hearsay. Prior to his murder, the murder victim in Sallie
discussed with a third party the pending divorce between his daughter
and appellant and stated, "[there's going to be a killing before this is
over."147 Appellant sought to admit this statement at trial, but the
trial court excluded it.' 4" The supreme court noted the statement's
ambiguity as to who would be killed and emphasized that the evidence
showed no struggle between appellant and the victim. 14 9
Citing

140. 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003).
141. Id. at 512-13, 578 S.E.2d at 452.
142. Id. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 452.
143. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456, 458, 448 S.E.2d 177, 178 (1994);
Shouse v. State, 231 Ga. 716, 719, 203 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1974)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Wall v. State, 269 Ga. 506, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998) (holding that evidence
of past difficulties between defendant and victim is admissible without a pretrial hearing
when it provides insight into motive and when the trial court instructs the jury on the
limited use it may make of such evidence)).
147. Id. at 516, 578 S.E.2d at 455.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Massey v. State, 5 ° the court found no error in excluding the statement.'5 '
During the guilt phase of the Arevalo v. State 52 trial, the State
introduced a letter allegedly written by appellant's brother, David
Arevalo, to appellant while both were inmates in the county jail. The
letter included specifics about the crime and the individuals involved in
it. Appellant objected to the admission of the letter on multiple grounds
at trial and on appeal.1 5 3 Though Justice Thompson, joined in his
dissent by Justices Fletcher and Sears, concluded that the State's
showing of the letter's authenticity was insufficient to render it
admissible,M the supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding of a
prima facie showing of the letter's authenticity. 5 5 Upholding the trial
court's admission of the letter despite appellant's objection that the letter
amounted to hearsay, the court reasoned that because the two Arevalo
brothers were engaged in an ongoing conspiracy when the letter was
written, the letter fell under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule.'
Chief Justice Fletcher, joined in his dissent by Justice Sears,
argued that the hearsay exception did not apply to the letter because the
brothers had already admitted to their involvement in the armed robbery
to law enforcement officials, and therefore, the conspiracy had ended
before the letter was written. 7 Fletcher challenged the assumption
that the brothers were conspiring to conceal their involvement in the
murders at the time of the letter's writing because under Georgia
criminal law, the Arevalos had already implicated themselves in the
murders by admitting their involvement in the surrounding armed

150. 272 Ga. 50,525 S.E.2d 694 (2000) (holding that the hearsay bar against admission
of threats made by the murder victim against, but unknown to, the perpetrator is only
excepted in cases of inconsistencies in evidence as to who started the conflict that resulted
in death, to substantiate other communicated threats, and establish the stance of the
victim).
151. 276 Ga. at 516, 578 S.E.2d at 455.
152. 275 Ga. 392, 567 S.E.2d 303 (2002).
153. Id. at 395, 567 S.E.2d at 307.
154. Id. at 403, 567 S.E.2d at 312 (Thompson, J., and Sears, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, arguing that the letter was erroneously admitted and calling for a reversal of the
appellant's convictions and sentences, Thompson found the letter unsatisfactorily
authenticated because (1) the state relied solely on an investigator employed by the district
attorney's office to authenticate the letter, and (2) David Arevalo's verbal admission that
he wrote the letter was itself hearsay and inadmissible. Id. at 402-03, 567 S.E.2d at 31112.
155. Id. at 396, 567 S.E.2d at 307.
156. Id. at 397, 567 S.E.2d at 308 (citing Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 421, 136 S.E.
448, 454-55 (1926)).
157. Id. at 400-01, 567 S.E.2d at 310-11 (Fletcher, C.J., and Sears, J., dissenting).
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robbery.15 Fletcher also argued in his dissent that the State had not
demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability to have the letter admitted
because David was engaged in plea negotiations at the time of the
letter's writing. 59 However, the court held that the trial court correctly found sufficient indicia of reliability, as David had nothing to gain in
his negotiations with the prosecution.'"
5. Demonstrative Evidence. Appellant in Sallie argued error in
the trial court's admission of photographs of the murder victim at the
crime scene and prior to autopsy.'61 Stating that the photos "depicted
the location of the body [at the crime scene] and the nature and extent
of the six bullet wounds,"'62 the supreme court found that the photographs were relevant and admissible.'63
B.

Sufficiency of Evidence

In Arevalo the supreme court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to support a conviction.'s 4 In reaching this conclusion, the
court cited the following: (1) the crimes occurred at a restaurant from
which appellant had recently been discharged; (2) appellant's brother
deliberately left the restaurant's back door open to facilitate the armed
robbery during which the murders occurred; and (3) appellant, though
initially denying involvement in the crimes, admitted limited participation in the armed robbery but165denied that he was the triggerman or that
the shootings were planned.
Appellant in Lawler v. State 66 was convicted of malice murder,
aggravated battery on a peace officer, and other crimes. The jury
recommended a death sentence for the murder of one police officer and
the nonfatal shooting of another police officer, which occurred after the
officers escorted Lawler's inebriated girlfriend home in 1997. Four
neighbors testified to seeing parts of the shooting at Lawler's apartment

158. Id. Fletcher's dissent further attacks the majority's stance of a second concealment
conspiracy by arguing that the only evidence of such a conspiracy is the letter itself. Id.
at 401, 567 S.E.2d at 311.
159. Id. at 401, 567 S.E.2d at 311.
160. Id. at 398, 567 S.E.2d at 309.
161. 276 Ga. at 517, 578 S.E.2d at 455.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 512 S.E.2d 241 (1999); Jenkins v. State,
269 Ga. 282, 293, 498 S.E.2d 502, 514 (1998)).
164. 275 Ga. at 393, 567 S.E.2d at 305-06 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979)).
165. Id. at 392-93, 567 S.E.2d at 305.
166. 276 Ga. 229, 576 S.E.2d 841 (2003).
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and shell casings were found in and outside Lawler's apartment.
Furthermore, other law enforcement officers found the victims' bodies in
front of Lawler's apartment, and the victims' pistols were still snapped
in their holsters. 167 This evidence, as well as the murder weapon,
ammunition, and other firearms found in appellant's apartment,
combined with the testimony of appellant's co-worker regarding Lawler's
animus for law enforcement, was deemed sufficient by the supreme court
for a rational factfinder to find Lawler guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of malice murder, felony murder, and the other charges related to the
incident." 6 Moreover, the court held that the evidence was sufficient
to authorize a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
statutory aggravating circumstances to support a death sentence.16 9
In Terrell v. State, 70 appellant was convicted in the shooting and
beating death of his mother's elderly employer. Prior to the murder,
Terrell had admitted to forging the victim's checks after having been
discovered by the victim. Evidence at the crime scene indicated that the
victim was shot in a manner consistent with appellant's congenital wrist
defect. Terrell's cousin confessed to their mutual involvement in the
murder and gave details that corroborated the crime scene evidence.
Witnesses testified to seeing individuals matching Terrell's description
in the vicinity of the victim's home on the morning of the murder, and
appellant contradicted himself when making his second statement to
police.' 7 1 The court held that this evidence was sufficient to find
Terrell guilty of malice murder and forgery and to authorize a jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence
72 of statutory aggravating
circumstances to support a death sentence.
The court again found sufficient evidence to support a conviction in
Spickler v. State,'7 in which appellant was convicted of murder and
armed robbery.'74 The evidence introduced at trial included a showing
that appellant met and socialized with the victim months before the
crime and that appellant and his accomplice were out with the victim
the night of the murder, which was the same evening that appellant and
his accomplice were guests in the victim's home. Appellant and his
accomplice made purchases with the victim's credit cards after fleeing

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 229-31, 576 S.E.2d at 844-45.
Id. at 231, 576 S.E.2d at 845.
Id.
276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002).
Id. at 34-37, 572 S.E.2d at 598-99.
Id. at 37, 572 S.E.2d at 599.
276 Ga. 164, 575 S.E.2d 482 (2003).
Id. at 164-65, 575 S.E.2d at 484-85.
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the state, and the victim's personal property was found in appellant's
car. At trial, appellant admitted to killing the victim, claiming that he
did so because of the victim's unwanted sexual advances. 7 5 Calling
the jury the "arbiter of credibility,"'7 6 the court found that the jury was
not required to believe appellant's claim of provocation or denial of
The court stated that the jury can find criminal
premeditation.'
intent "upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and
all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is
prosecuted." 7 '
In Hinely v. State,'7 9 appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and more specifically,
that no evidence existed to corroborate the inculpatory testimony of his
accomplice. 80 Stating that "[t]he corroborating evidence connecting a
defendant to a crime may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence"18 '
and that "even slight evidence of corroboration connecting an accused to
a crime is legally sufficient,"" 2 the court held that the accomplice's
testimony was corroborated.'"' Pointing to evidence that the body was
found in a manner consistent with the accomplice's testimony, that the
murder weapon was identified as a knife borrowed by Hinely from
another witness, and that other witnesses had seen Hinely and the
accomplice driving together near the victim's house on the day of the
crime, among other evidence, the court found sufficient evidence to
enable a rational trier of fact to find Hinely guilty of felony murder.'84
The court found sufficient evidence to authorize appellant's conviction
on all charges in Braley.35 The court highlighted evidence that
appellant made repeated attempts to obtain money from automated
teller machines using the murder victim's bank cards and that upon
approach by arresting officers, appellant said, "You've got me, take me
in," and "Everything you're looking for is in the car." 186 The court also
noted the consent search of Braley's car that revealed hair and blood on

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 16-2-6 (1999)).
179. 275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002).
180. Id. at 779, 573 S.E.2d at 70.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 572, 501 S.E.2d 810 (1998) (brackets in
original)).

183. Id.
184. Id. at 779-80, 573 S.E.2d at 70-71.
185. 276 Ga. at 47-49, 572 S.E.2d 588-89.
186. Id. at 48, 572 S.E.2d at 589.
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the murder weapons consistent with that of the victim, Braley's detailed
confession, and Braley's admission to officers that the weapons had been
used in the "murder of that insurance lady."187
C.

Cross-Examination

Appellant in Terrell argued error by the trial court in restricting his
cross-examination of a state witness who testified about inculpatory
statements made by appellant."8
Under cross-examination, the
witness claimed an aversion to participating in murder but also admitted
to a past felony murder conviction and other felony convictions without
attempting to explain any of these convictions. When appellant's counsel
attempted to question the witness about the details of the felony murder,
the trial court sustained the State's objection that these details were not
relevant.189 The supreme court noted that while proof of a conviction
of a crime of moral turpitude may be used to impeach a witness, "the
details of that crime are not relevant unless the witness attempts to
rehabilitate himself by explaining the circumstance of his conviction."' 9 While appellant argued that the details of the crime were
relevant to disprove the witness's claimed aversion to murder, the court
held that the witness's aversion or non-aversion to murder was not
relevant to appellant's guilt or innocence.' 91 The court noted that the
only way in which the truthfulness of the witness's stated aversion
would be relevant was as a basis for determining the general credibility
of the witness's testimony.192 Looking at the details of the witness's
felony murder conviction, the court found nothing in his conviction
record that impeached the witness's stated aversion to murder,
rendering the details of the felony murder irrelevant to the instant
trial.'9 3 Noting the trial court's broad discretion in determining the
scope of cross-examination, the court found no error in limiting
appellant's cross-examination.'
The court again found no error in the limitations on cross-examination
imposed by the trial court in Sallie.'95 Appellant sought to crossexamine one of the kidnapping victims about an audio tape and notes

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
276 Ga. at 42-43, 572 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 43, 572 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. (citing Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 235, 442 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1994)).
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 603-04.
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 604.
Id.
Id.
276 Ga. at 515, 578 S.E.2d at 454.
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appellant made while the victim was being held against her will that
"could be construed as regretful for the violent actions he had taken." 196 While the trial court allowed appellant to question the witness

with respect to the substance of the statements on the tape and in the
notes, appellant was not permitted to elicit that the statements were
documented.19 v Noting that appellant refused his opportunity to admit
the tape and notes into evidence during cross-examination, the court
found no error in the restriction on cross-examination because appellant
from eliciting that [the statements] had been
was "only prevented
198
memorialized."
D. Closing Arguments
In Arevalo the appellant complained about the prosecutor's closing
argument, which referred to defense counsel's objections during trial to
the introduction of a letter allegedly written by appellant's brother. 9
The court stated that counsel has "ample latitude to argue what has
transpired in a case from its inception to its conclusion, and the conduct
of the party or his counsel ... .,,200Noting that because defense
counsel's numerous objections were part of the trial, and as such,
that the State could comment on,201 the court found no
something
2
20

error.

Appellant in Spickler also raised complaints about the State's closing
arguments at his jury trial.20 3 The court stated that because appellant
testified about his past conviction of a crime of moral turpitude during
direct examination, the prosecutor was permitted to use the past
conviction to undermine appellant's credibility even without admitting
a certified copy of the conviction into evidence.2 °4 During closing
arguments, the prosecutor asked the jury to infer that the difference
between appellant's testimony in court and his statement to police at the
time of his arrest was due to appellant's attempt to secure a jury charge
on the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter. 5 The court found
nothing improper in the prosecutor's argument because this was a

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 515-16, 578 S.E.2d at 454-55.
275 Ga. at 398, 567 S.E.2d at 309.
Id. (quoting Ferrell v. State, 149 Ga. App. 405, 409, 254 S.E.2d 404, 408 (1979)).
Id. (citing Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 181, 51 S.E.2d 13, 31 (1948)).

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
276 Ga. at 167, 575 S.E.2d at 486.
Id.
Id. at 167-68, 575 S.E.2d at 486.
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"reasonable inference drawn from the evidence at trial."2 °6 Similarly,
the court rejected appellant's contention that the State expressed a
personal opinion regarding appellant's truthfulness during closing
arguments, stating that upon review of the transcript, the prosecutor
was simply commenting on evidence.2 7
E.

Jury Charges
The court in Sallie found no error in the jury charge given at the guiltinnocence phase of Sallie's trial. 20 8 Noting that the jury was properly
charged on both intent and burden of proof for each element of the
charged offenses, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal of
appellant's requested charge that "resembled the Allen charge given to
deadlocked juries."20 9 In response to appellant's challenge to the
adequacy of the jury's charge on kidnapping with bodily injury, the court
concluded that the charge, "taken as a whole,"210 sufficiently charged
the jury on the elements of the alleged offense, as well as on the
definition of "bodily injury."211 Similarly, the court found no error in
the trial court's charge to the jury that it must "find each element of the
crimes charged in the indictment
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
212
render a guilty verdict."

Appealing his conviction of malice murder, an alternative count of
felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, and
aggravated battery, appellant in Braley argued that the trial court erred
in the jury charges.218 Claiming that the evidence showed that the
transportation of the victim occurred after her death, appellant argued
error in the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on false imprisonment
as a lesser included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury.214 The
court found no reversible error because of the conclusion that "[i]n light
of the overwhelming evidence that the victim was alive when
dragged,"215 the trial court's failure to give the requested charge
probably did not contribute to the jury's verdict. 213 Appellant also

206.

Id. at 168, 575 S.E.2d at 486-87.

207. Id., 575 S.E.2d at 487.
208. 276 Ga. at 512, 578 S.E.2d at 452.
209. Id.

210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Green v. State, 193 Ga. App. 894, 389 S.E.2d 358 (1989); Roberts v.
State, 158 Ga. App. 309, 279 S.E.2d 753 (1981)).
212. Id.

213. 276 Ga. at 53-54, 572 S.E.2d at 592-93.
214. Id. at 53, 572 S.E.2d at 592.
215. Id.

216. Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 133, 442 S.E.2d 444, 445-46 (1994)).
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alleged error in that the jury charge allowed the jury to convict him
upon a finding that he committed armed robbery with a firearm or a
knife whereas the indictment charged him with the same crime
committed with a firearm and a knife.2 17 While stating that "[t]rial
courts should tailor their charges to match the allegation of indictments
... [to direct] the jury to consider only whether the crimes were
committed in the manner alleged in the indictment,"21 the court
continued:
[Where, as here, the indictment places a defendant on notice that the
State will attempt to prove that he committed a crime in more than
one manner, the jury is authorized to convict the defendant of that
crime upon
proof that it was committed in any of the several manners
219
alleged.
The court found no error, concluding that the charge on armed robbery
"could not have misled the jury into convicting [a]ppellant for committing that crime in any way not alleged in the indictment."220 Appellant's allegation of error on the trial court's felony murder charge was
22 1
declared moot because of appellant's conviction for malice murder.
In addition, the court would not permit appellant to complain on appeal
about the trial court's charge on kidnapping with bodily injury because
appellant previously requested that specific instruction.2 22
In the guilt-innocence phase of appellant's trial in Terrell, the jury was
charged on use of a deadly weapon, but the charge was invalidated
shortly thereafter 223 in Harris v. State.224 Though recognizing that
the recent holding in Harris applies to Terrell, the court found no
reversible error in the use of this charge in appellant's trial.225

217.

Id.

218. Id. at 53, 572 S.E.2d at 592-93 (citation omitted).
219. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 593 (citing Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377-78, 511
S.E.2d 899, 902-03 (1999)).

220. Id. (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 53-54, 572 S.E.2d at 593.
222. Id. at 53, 572 S.E.2d at 592.
223.
224.

276 Ga. at 37, 572 S.E.2d at 599-600.
273 Ga. 608, 610, 543 S.E.2d 716, 717 (2001) (holding that the trial court's jury

charge:
If a person of sound mind and discretion intentionally and without justification
uses a deadly weapon or instrumentality in the manner in which the weapon or
instrumentality is ordinarily used and thereby causes the death of a human being,
you many infer the intent to kill,
is error even if accompanied by an instruction that the jury has the discretion to make the
inference).
225.

276 Ga. at 37, 572 S.E.2d at 600.
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Explaining that the erroneous charge dealt with a defense of justification, whereas appellant's defense was that of innocence, the court noted
"the overwhelming evidence of malice" 2 6 in the case and found no
ground for reversing appellant's conviction based on the jury charge. 27
F

Merger of Offenses

In Braley the evidence indicated that appellant "threw the victim to
the ground, inflicted an ultimately fatal wound to her throat, and
continued attacking her with the knife until she weakened or became
unconscious."22
Given these facts, the court found that appellant's
conviction for aggravated battery for allegedly causing the victim's
disfigurement by cutting her throat, merged with the malice murder
conviction, and the court vacated the conviction
and sentence was
22 9
entered upon the aggravated battery verdict.
G.

Mistrial

Appellant in Spickler argued that two of the State's courtroom
demonstrations warranted a mistrial.23 ° In one demonstration, the
medical examiner used a model skull and a portion of a mattress to
demonstrate how the victim's skull moved into the mattress when
bludgeoned. Appellant objected, but did not move for a mistrial.3 1
Deeming the demonstration relevant as a fair illustration of the force of
the attack, the court found that this demonstration did not warrant a
sua sponte declaration of mistrial.2 32 In the second contested demonstration, the prosecutor hit a block of wood with a hammer, producing
a loud noise unlikely to have been made during the killing, while
questioning appellant as to how hard he struck the victim. The trial
court sustained appellant's objection to the demonstration and stopped
it; however, appellant's motion for mistrial was denied. 3
The supreme court held that this demonstration, which only occurred once
before being stopped by the court, was "improper," but "not so prejudicial

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 52, 572 S.E.2d at 592.
229. Id. at 52-53,572 S.E.2d at 592 (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1); Fitzpatrick v. State,
268 Ga. 423, 423-24, 489 S.E.2d 840, 841 (1997); Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 374, 434
S.E.2d 479, 482-84 (1993)).
230. 276 Ga. at 167, 575 S.E.2d at 486.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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to appellant's fair trial rights to warrant the extreme remedy of granting
a mistrial."2 "
IV.

SENTENCING

This section covers pleas, admissible bad character evidence and
victim impact evidence, closing arguments, jury charges, jury instructions, judge's comments, statutory aggravators, and double jeopardy.
A.

Pleas

In Wright v. State,23 5 appellant pleaded guilty to murder, robbery,
and concealment of the victim's body. After he was sentenced, appellant
filed a pro se motion to have the guilty plea withdrawn, but the trial
court denied this motion. 2 6" The supreme court found no procedural
indiscretions in the trial court's acceptance of appellant's plea, noting
that the trial court complied with the requirements of the Uniform
Superior Court Rules.2 37 Appellant argued that he was misled by
original counsel as to the evidence that would be used against him at
trial. Specifically, appellant claimed that his attorney incorrectly
informed him that his accomplice had pleaded guilty to assisting in the
disposal of the victim's body and would testify against him at trial.3 8
The record indicated that appellant was informed prior to his plea
hearing that the accomplice was granted immunity and was going to
testify.2 9 Based on this information, the court determined that
whether appellant was misinformed with respect to whether the
accomplice pleaded guilty or received immunity was irrelevant because
appellant would have faced the accomplice's testimony at trial.24 °
Because this misinformation, even if transmitted, would have no
influence on appellant's decision to plead guilty, the court found that
appellant failed to show that manifest injustice would occur if a
withdrawal was
not permitted, as required in post-sentencing plea
241
withdrawals.
After being convicted on two counts of felony murder, appellant in
Hinely v. State24 2 accepted a sentence of life without the possibility of

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
275 Ga. 497, 570 S.E.2d 280 (2002).
Id. at 497, 570 S.E.2d at 280.
Id. at 497-98, 570 S.E.2d at 281 (citing UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 33.9, 33.8).
Id. at 498, 570 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002).
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parole. 2 ' Though at the time of the plea appellant stated that his plea
was freely and voluntarily given, on appeal appellant argued that
counsel's lack of preparation for the sentencing phase of trial effectively
rendered his plea coerced. 2" Finding no error, the court cited its own
determination that appellant's counsel was not inadequately prepared
for the sentencing phase and further stated that "the prospect of a
greater sentence is not coercion
that prevents the decision [to plead]
245
from being free and voluntary."
B.

Admission of Evidence

2
Bad Character Evidence. Appellant in Braley v. State "
1.
argued that the State improperly introduced the issue of bad character
into the sentencing phase of his trial. 247 The supreme court found no
error in the State's elicitation of testimony that appellant had stolen the
weapon used in the murder, stating that "reliable evidence of bad
character and of past crimes is admissible in the sentencing phase of a
death penalty trial."2 "

2. Victim Impact Evidence. In Arevalo v. State,2 49 appellant
alleged error in the trial court's admission of victim-impact evidence at
the sentencing phase of his trial, arguing that all such evidence is
unconstitutional and prohibited.2 5 ° The court affirmed the constitutionality of such evidence, stating, "proper victim-impact evidence in the
sentencing phase of a death penalty trial is constitutional and admissi25
ble." 1
The court again affirmed the general constitutionality of victim-impact
evidence at the sentencing phase in Braley.2 52 Without elaboration,
the court found that the trial court correctly followed the recommended
procedure for pretrial review of such evidence.253

243. Id. at 783, 573 S.E.2d at 73.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Shakur v. State, 239 Ga. 548, 549-50, 238 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1977)).
246. 276 Ga. 47, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002).
247. Id. at 54, 572 S.E.2d at 593.
248. Id. (citing Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 345, 519 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1999)).
249. 275 Ga. 392, 567 S.E.2d 303 (2002).
250. Id. at 399, 567 S.E.2d at 309.
251. Id. (citing Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 214-16, 486 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1997);
Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994)).
252. 276 Ga. at 54, 572 S.E.2d at 593 (citing Livingston, 264 Ga. at 402-05, 444 S.E.2d
at 748).
253. Id. (citing Turner, 268 Ga. at 214-15, 486 S.E.2d at 839).
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In Lawler v. State," the court explained255 that the trial court's
handling of victim-impact evidence was within the standards outlined in
Turner v. State.25 6 Noting that this procedure allowed appellant
multiple opportunities to challenge the testimony eventually presented
to the jury, the court found that this evidence was not improper or
unduly prejudicial.25 7 While recognizing that the record revealed that
some witnesses and jurors cried during the victim-impact testimony, the
court found no "outbursts or displays of emotion that would unduly
prejudice the defendant."258 Finding no error in the trial court's denial
of appellant's objection to this testimony, the court stated: "The
testimony to be primarily guarded against in death penalty trials
involves the issue of arbitrary factors in the decision to impose a death
sentence,... not
the emotion caused by the defendant's actions and the
25 9
ensuing loss."

C.

Closing Arguments

Appellant in Braley complained of the prosecutor's closing arguments
in which the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion and discussed
defense counsel's arguments made in unrelated cases, thereby comparing
the instant case to others.2 ° After reviewing the record, the court
concluded that the statements were not improper. 21' Appellant also
complained about other elements of the State's closing argument that
were not objected to at trial.262 Noting that the proper standard of
review for reversal of such statements is a finding that the statements
were not only improper but also had a reasonable probability of
impacting the jury's choice in imposing a death sentence,"' the court
found that the prosecutor's argument with respect to appellant's future
dangerousness was not improper.2 ' The prosecutor's request that the

254. 276 Ga. 229, 576 S.E.2d 841 (2003).
255. Id. at 232, 576 S.E.2d at 846.
256. 268 Ga. 213, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997).
257. Id. (citing Turner, 268 Ga. at 215-16, 486 S.E.2d at 839; Pickren v. State, 269 Ga.
453, 500 S.E.2d 566 (1998); Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592, 481 S.E.2d 821 (1997)).
258. Id. (citing Jones, 267 Ga. at 595-96, 481 S.E.2d at 821).
259. Id. (citing Jones, 267 Ga. at 595-96, 481 S.E.2d at 821; Livingston, 264 Ga. at 402,
444 S.E.2d at 748; O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35).
260. 276 Ga. at 54, 572 S.E.2d at 593.
261. Id. (contrasting its decisions in Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 863-64, 485 S.E.2d
470,473-74 (1997) (holding that prosecutors should not present their personal opinion) and
Booker v. State, 242 Ga. App. 80, 84, 528 S.E.2d 849, 852 (2000) (holding that comparisons
between the instant case and others is an improper injection of matters not in evidence)).
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 712, 532 S.E.2d 677, 688 (2000)).
264. Id. (citing Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779, 788, 505 S.E.2d 4, 13-14 (1998)).
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jury sit in silence for five minutes to illustrate the length of time the
victim remained conscious after her attack was permissible because it
gave the jury a "better grasp of what occurred during this period of
time."2

5

However, the court found that the prosecutor's request that

the jury "imagine what it was feeling like for [the victim]" was not
permissible as "it is well settled that it is improper to ask the jury to
imagine themselves in the victim's place."2

This error did not require

a new trial, however, because the court found that this impermissible
argument did not have a reasonable probability of changing the jury's
sentencing choice.267
D. Jury Charge
In Sallie v. State,26 8 no reversible error was found in the jury
instructions given during the penalty phase of appellant's trial. 269 The
court held that when the jury has been charged that its verdict with
respect to the sentence had to be unanimous, there is no further
requirement that the jury be charged that a finding of statutory
aggravating circumstance be unanimous.27 ° Similarly, the court found
that because the jury was properly charged that it could grant a life
sentence for any reason or no reason, the trial court did not err in not
charging the jury that non-statutory aggravating circumstances may
only be considered when proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
271 that
mitigating circumstances do not need to be found unanimously.
Appellant in Sallie argued error in the jury instructions given during
the penalty phase. 2 In response to the jury question: "If a prisoner
receives a sentence of life without parole, are there any circumstances
that a prisoner can ever be released from prison?," the trial court
instructed the jury to refer to the portion of the written jury charge
available to them in the jury room that defined life imprisonment
without parole.2 7" The court found no error in this instruction.2 74

265. Id. at 54-55, 572 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting State v. Jones, 487 S.E.2d 714, 720 (N.C.
1997)).
266. Id. at 55, 572 S.E.2d at 593-94 (quoting Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 844, 524
S.E.2d 490, 506 (1999)).

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
Ga. 11,
272.
273.
274.

Id., 572 S.E.2d at 594 (citing Pace, 271 Ga. at 844, 524 S.E.2d at 490).
276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003).
Id. at 512, 578 S.E.2d at 452.
Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 525 S.E.2d 339 (1999)).
Id. (citing Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001); Lance v. State, 275
25, 560 S.E.2d 663, 678 (2002)).
Id. at 511, 578 S.E.2d at 451.
Id.
Id. (citing McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996)).
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Judge's Comment

In Braley appellant complained about the trial judge's comment made
to jurors when the jurors were given a written copy of the sentencing
phase charges."'
Evaluating appellant's claim of error, the court
reviewed the judge's comment and the charge together as a whole.276
The court found no error because the comment "would have been
understood ... to stress that the document was not evidence," and would
not have misled the jurors into disregarding the parts of the charge
"defining the role of mitigating evidence."277
F

Statutory Aggravators
279
27s
appellant in Terrell v. State
Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey,
argued that his constitutional rights were violated because his indictment did not include the statutory aggravators used to support his death
sentence. 8 ° Reasoning that the United States Supreme Court's focus
in Apprendi is to ensure that every fact key to the authorization of a
death sentence is found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, the court
concluded that the Court's holding in Apprendi did not specify that
notice of each such fact be conveyed to the defendant via the indictment
rather than some other means.2"' Because appellant was put on notice
of both the State's intent to seek the death penalty and the statutory
aggravators the State would use to support its case for a death sentence
through the State's renewed notice of intent to seek the death penalty,
the court concluded that appellant's constitutional right to notice was
met.282 The court dismissed the argument that the holding in Apprendi requires a grand jury to consider the statutory aggravators in a
particular case, stating that the Court in Apprendi did not inquire into
whether the federal constitution requires a state grand jury to consider

275. 276 Ga. at 55, 572 S.E.2d at 594.
276. Id. (citing Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 238, 517 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1999)).
277. Id.
278. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact ... that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Fourteenth Amendment
commands the same answer in [cases] involving a state statute.
Id. at 476.
279. 276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002).
280. Id. at 40, 572 S.E.2d at 602.
281. Id. at 41, 572 S.E.2d at 602.
282. Id. at 41-42, 572 S.E.2d at 602-03.
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2 3
such statutory aggravating factorsY.
Because "[niothing in Apprendi
...
renders unconstitutional Georgia's system for bringing death penalty
prosecutions to trial,"2 4 the court maintained that appellant's indictment by a grand jury for malice murder permitted the State to seek any
penalty authorized by statute for that crime, including death. 5
While the majority in Terrell held that "the State [is] not under a
constitutional obligation to place the statutory aggravators in the
indictment" 286 after Apprendi, Justice Benham, in his special concurrence, "t[ook] issue" with this conclusion.
Justice Benham found
that "the absence of statutory aggravators from the indictment was
error,"8 8 but that the error in the instant case was harmless.2 9

G.

Double Jeopardy

Appellant in Terrell challenged his death sentence on double jeopardy
grounds, arguing that because a jury in a previous trial for the same
crime deadlocked over his guilt or innocence, this previous jury had, by
definition, failed to find the statutory aggravators which were used in
the instant trial to support his current death sentence. 29" The court
rejected appellant's contention that double jeopardy prevents subsequent
juries from finding statutory aggravators that a previous jury did not
find, stating that "[d]ouble jeopardy does not prevent a retrial when29a1
previous jury was hopelessly deadlocked over the defendant's guilt."
The court went on to specify that Miller v. State292 was not applicable
to the instant case because the jury in appellant's first trial never
reached the penalty phase and thus was never called on to determine
appellant's sentence.293

283. Id. at 42, 572 S.E.2d at 603 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 477 n.3)).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 47, 572 S.E.2d at 606 (Benham, J., concurring specially).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 38, 572 S.E.2d at 600.
291. Id. at 39, 572 S.E.2d at 601 (citing Griffin v. State, 264 Ga. 232, 233, 443 S.E.2d
612, 612 (1994)).
292. 237 Ga. 557, 229 S.E.2d 376 (1976) (holding that a jury's inability to agree upon
a particular sentence after conviction does not amount to a finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance, limiting the judge's sentencing options to life imprisonment).
293. 276 Ga. at 39, 572 S.E.2d at 601.
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PRESERVATION OF ERRORS

This section discusses failure to object, timeliness of objection, and
procedural default.
A.

Failureto Object
The court in Braley v. State2' held that appellant waived his right
to complain about various issues on appeal by not objecting at trial.295
Citing Earnest v. State,29 the court found appellant's lack of objection
to each of the following matters prevented appellate review: the
presence of court personnel in the courtroom during ex parte hearings,297 the trial court's sua sponte excusal of two prospective jurors,298 the limitations placed on voir dire,299 the potential tainting
of a panel of prospective jurors by one juror's comment on the commuting of death sentences, °° the trial court's comment to prospective
jurors that the law required their placement in panels for voir dire, s( l
the prosecutor's comments to appellant's mother at the beginning of her
cross-examination,0 2 and the trial court's decision not to allow appellant's 3counsel to undertake a second redirect examination of a witness.

30

Timeliness of Objection
Appellant in Spickler v. State304 argued error in the trial court's
denial of his motion for a mistrial.0 5 Claiming that the testimony of
a state witness was "nonresponsive to the question and prejudicial,"0 6
appellant did not object or raise the mistrial motion until after the
witness in question and another witness finished their testimony and

B.

294. 276 Ga. 47, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002).
295. Id. at 50, 51, 52, 54, 572 S.E.2d at 590-94.
296. 262 Ga. 494, 422 S.E.2d 188 (1992). The court stated: "Errors not raised in the
trial court will not be heard on appeal." Id. at 495, 422 S.E.2d 188 (citing Boutwell v.
State, 256 Ga. 63, 65-66, 344 S.E.2d 222, 225 (1986)).
297. 276 Ga. at 50, 572 S.E.2d at 590.
298. Id. at 51-52, 572 S.E.2d at 591.
299. Id. at 52, 572 S.E.2d at 591.
300. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 592.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 55, 572 S.E.2d at 594.
303. Id.
304. 276 Ga. 164, 575 S.E.2d 482 (2003).
305. Id. at 166, 575 S.E.2d at 486.
306. Id.
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were excused. °7 Because the court found that appellant's objection
was not a "contemporaneous objection made on the record at the earliest
possible3 °9time,"30 8 it held that the issue was not preserved for appellate
review.
C. ProceduralDefault
After the supreme court upheld his death sentence in 1997 in
Thomason v. State,"'° Thomason petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
on multiple grounds. The petition was granted on the ground that
Thomason had not been afforded effective assistance of counsel during
the sentencing phase of his bench trial. 11 In Head v. Thomason,1 2
the warden appealed the habeas court's order granting a new sentencing
trial, and Thomason cross-appealed the habeas court's rejection of his
other claims of constitutional error. Among the claims in the crossappeal, Thomason argued that his written and oral waiver of a jury trial
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.3 13 Noting that this claim
would normally be barred by procedural default because it was not
raised on direct appeal, the court stated that if Thomason proved his
counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal was an act of
ineffective assistance, it "would serve both as cause to set aside the
procedural bar and as an independent claim."" 4 After examining the
record and concluding that Thomason's underlying claim of an involuntary waiver was without merit,315 the court found that counsel did not
render ineffective assistance in not raising such a meritless claim on
direct appeal. 1 6 As such, there was
"no cause to set aside the proce31 7
dural bar to the underlying claim."
Many of the remaining issues brought by Thomason in his crossappeal were deemed barred by procedural default.1 8 Citing Head v.
319
Ferrell,
the court found insufficient showing of "cause and prejudice"

307. Id.
308. Id. at 166-67, 575 S.E.2d at 486.
309. Id. at 167, 575 S.E.2d at 486.
310. 268 Ga. 298, 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997).
311. Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434, 434-35, 578 S.E.2d 426, 428 (2003).
312. 276 Ga. 434, 578 S.E.2d 426 (2003).
313. Id. at 440, 578 S.E.2d at 432.
314. Id. (citing Head v. Ferrell, 274 Ga. 399, 401-02, 554 S.E.2d 155, 160 (2001)).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 440-42, 578 S.E.2d at 432-33.
319. 276 Ga. at 401, 554 S.E.2d at 160. Claims other than those regarding sentencing
"that are raised for the first time in habeas corpus proceedings that could have been raised
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to set aside the procedural bar on each of the following issues: alleged
suppression of evidence by the State, 20 a claim regarding the Unified
Appeal Procedure, 2 ' a claim regarding cumulative error,322 a claim
of trial while incompetent,323 a claim regarding Thomason being called
as a witness at his competency trial, 324 a claim regarding Thomason's
absence during parts of his trial, 25 and allegations of misconduct by
competency trial jurors. 2 6

VI.

DIRECT APPEAL

This section discusses challenges to Georgia's death penalty statute,
the supreme court's proportionality review, and death sentences
influenced by passion or prejudice.
A.

Georgia'sDeath Penalty Statute

The supreme court ruled against appellants' challenges to Georgia's
death penalty statutes in both Braley v. State3 27 and Arevalo v.
State,3" simply stating in each case, "Georgia's death penalty statutes
are not unconstitutional."32 9
B.

ProportionalityReview

In Terrell v. State, ° appellant argued that a prior jury's deadlock
during the guilt phase of an earlier trial rendered his current death
sentence for the same crime disproportionate. 331 The court stated that
appellant's argument "reads more into [Georgia's comparative sentencing
review statute] than exists," and appellant's reading of O.C.G.A section
17-10-35(c)(2)332 would incorrectly render it a "comparative trial

at trial or on direct appeal are barred by procedural default unless the petitioner can meet
the 'cause and prejudice' test." Id.
320. 276 Ga. at 441, 578 S.E.2d at 432.
321. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 433.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 442, 578 S.E.2d at 433.
327. 276 Ga. 47, 572 S.E.2d 583 (2002).
328. 275 Ga. 392, 567 S.E.2d 303 (2002).
329. Id. at 399, 567 S.E.2d at 309 (citing Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 86, 561 S.E.2d
414, 429 (2002); Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 716, 532 S.E.2d 677, 690 (2002));
Braley, 276 Ga. at 56, 572 S.E.2d at 604.
330. 276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002).
331. Id. at 40, 572 S.E.2d at 601.
332. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(2) (1997).
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review."333 The court held that because the first jury never dealt with
the question of appellant's sentence, the jury's actions were not relevant
in the determination of the proportionality of appellant's current
334
sentence.
In determining whether appellant's death sentence was disproportionate in Sallie v. State,33 5 the court enumerated the aggravating circumstances surrounding the murder, including the evidence of planning,
forced entry, and kidnapping.3 6 Referencing cases in which victims
were murdered during the commission of a burglary or a kidnapping
with bodily injury, the court held that these "similar cases" supported a
33 7
death penalty in Sallie, rendering his death sentence proportionate.
The same method for determining the proportionality of the death
sentence was used by the court in Arevalo,338 Braley,3 9 and Lawler
v. State.3" The court in Arevalo stated that the outcome of multiple
cases concerning circumstances and aggravating factors similar to those
in Arevalo supported the imposition of the death sentence on appellant.341 In Braley the court pointed to other cases with circumstances
similar to those in Braley, including cases in which victims were
murdered during the commission of an armed robbery, and concluded
that these cases demonstrated that a death sentence was not disproportionate.342 Listing the aggravating factors relating to the murder of
the police officer in Lawler, the court compared the instant case to other
cases in which a police officer was killed, concluding, "Lawler's sentence
is... not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crimes and the defendant."3 4
C.

Sentence Influenced by Passion or Prejudice

Under O.C.G.A. section 17-10-35(c)(1), the supreme court is required
to review whether a death sentence was imposed "under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor."3'
Without elaboration, the court found that the death sentences imposed in Arevalo,

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

276 Ga. at 40, 572 S.E.2d at 602.
Id.
276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003).
Id. at 517, 578 S.E.2d at 455.
Id.
275 Ga. at 399, 567 S.E.2d at 309.
275 Ga. at 56, 572 S.E.2d at 595.
276 Ga. 229, 236, 576 S.E.2d 841, 849 (2003).
275 Ga. at 399, 567 S.E.2d at 309 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(3)).
275 Ga. at 56, 572 S.E.2d at 595 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(3)).
276 Ga. at 236, 576 S.E.2d at 849 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(3)).
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(1).
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Braley, Terrell, Lawler, and Sallie were each free from the influence of
these prohibited factors, simply stating: "[the death sentence in this
case] was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor." 45
VII.

MENTAL RETARDATION

46

In Rogers v. State, the supreme court affirmed appellant's conviction and death sentence on direct appeal prior to the court's ruling in
Fleming v. Zant. 47 In 1994 following Fleming, Rogers filed a petition
of habeas corpus seeking a jury trial on the issue of his mental
retardation. The evidence presented by appellant led the habeas court
to conclude that a genuine issue of fact existed with respect to appellant's mental retardation, and the habeas court granted a writ to
conduct a jury trial on that very issue.3 4 Just before the start of his
Fleming trial, appellant wrote to the judge, asking him to dismiss the
mental retardation trial. 49 After appellant stated that he was not
mentally retarded at a hearing on his dismissal request, the trial court
found that appellant had "knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] his right
to a jury trial on this issue of mental retardation.""' One month later,
with new counsel, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his waiver of
jury trial.35 ' Prior to the court's ruling on this motion, appellant again
wrote to the judge asking that the mental retardation trial be dismissed." 2 The trial court denied the motion and held that appellant
waived a jury trial on the issue of mental retardation.3 53 On an out-oftime appeal, appellant challenged the trial court's second finding of a
waiver of his right to a mental retardation trial. 5 4 The supreme court
reversed the trial court's determination, stating: "Once a petitioner
carries his burden of proof in the habeas corpus court of creating a
genuine issue regarding his mental retardation, the issue must be
thoroughly reviewed and passed upon. At such point in the proceedings,

345. Arevalo, 275 Ga. at 399, 567 S.E.2d at 309; Braley, 276 Ga. at 56, 572 S.E.2d at
594; Terrell, 276 Ga. at 45, 572 S.E.2d at 605; Lawler, 276 Ga. at 236, 576 S.E.2d at 848;
Sallie, 276 Ga. at 517, 578 S.E.2d at 455 (each citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(1)).
346. 276 Ga. 67, 575 S.E.2d 879 (2003).
347. 259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989). See Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 344 S.E.2d
644 (1986).
348. 276 Ga. at 68, 575 S.E.2d at 881.
349. Id.
350. Id. (brackets in original).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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the issue is no longer subject to waiver by a petitioner."355 Once an
appellant has presented sufficient evidence of mental retardation for a
habeas corpus court to conclude there is an issue for a jury, "it is the
duty of the trial court to conduct a jury trial on the issue of mental
356
retardation pursuant to the procedures established in Fleming."
VIII.

UNIFIED APPEAL

This section deals with the constitutionality of and compliance with
the Unified Appeal Procedure.
A.

Constitutionality
In Ramirez v. State,357 appellant complained of the use of 1990
census data to fix the percentage of black persons in appellant's 2000
grand jury source list."5 ' Because the actions complained of complied
with the Unified Appeal Procedure Rule II(C)(6), the supreme court
addressed the propriety of the mandate of Rule II(C)(6) that the most
recent decennial census data be used in compiling grand and traverse
jury pools. 59 The court affirmed its recent decision in Smith v.
State6 ° and upheld the constitutionality of this section of the Unified
Appeal Procedure, citing the jury commission's need to have "a valid
population benchmark" in making
determinations of underrepresentation
61
of minorities in jury pools.

The general constitutionality of the entire Unified Appeal Procedure
was affirmed by the court in Arevalo v. State362 and Braley v.
State.3"

355. Id. at 69, 575 S.E.2d at 882 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(a)).
356. Id. at 70, 575 S.E.2d at 882.
357. 276 Ga. 158, 575 S.E.2d 462 (2003).
358. Id. at 160, 575 S.E.2d at 465.
359. Id., 575 S.E.2d at 465-66.
360. 275 Ga. 715, 571 S.E.2d 740 (2002) (holding that the trial court did not err in
finding no equal representation violation where a grand jury source list for a 2000
indictment was based upon 1990 census data).
361. 276 Ga. at 160, 575 S.E.2d at 466 (quoting Smith, 275 Ga. at 719, 571 S.E.2d at
745).
362. 275 Ga. 392, 399, 567 S.E.2d 303, 309 (2002) (citing Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494,
498-99, 512 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1999)).
363. 276 Ga. 47, 49-50, 572 S.E.2d 583, 590 (2002) (citing Jackson, 270 Ga. at 498-99,
512 S.E.2d at 246).
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B.

Compliance
In Hinely v. State," appellant argued that his representation by a
single attorney at various points prior to trial was a violation of the
requirement of Unified Appeal Procedure Rule II(A)(1) that any
defendant facing death be represented by two attorneys. 6 5 Setting
aside the issue of whether this complaint was moot because appellant
did not receive a death sentence, the court found that appellant failed
to show "any specific harm from the violation,""' and that without
such specificity, the court could not determine whether the absence of
the second attorney was harmful. 6 7
Appellant in Ramirez complained that the trial court failed to meet its
responsibilities under the Unified Appeal Procedure because the jury
commissioner could not testify to the actual percentage of persons on the
grand and traverse jury source lists who were Hispanic, a group already
found by the court to be a Sixth Amendment cognizable group. 6 ' The
court held that in cases in which the grand and traverse jury source lists
are prepared by jury commissioners in the absence of data sufficient to
allow direct comparisons of percentages of minority groups, and when
the defendant has not produced such data himself through admissible
evidence, the trial court fulfills its duties under the Unified Appeal
Procedure in concluding that there is no significant underrepresentation,
in the absence of evidence otherwise.369
IX.

JURISDICTION

At issue in Head v. Thomason 7 ° was whether Thomason's notice of
cross-appeal, filed seventeen days after service by mail of the warden's
Dismissing Justice Thompson's
notice of appeal, was timely.371'
dissenting argument that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(e)37 2 does not control
cross-appeals, the court's majority stated that because the Appellate

364. 275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002).
365. Id. at 783, 573 S.E.2d at 72.
366. Id.
367. Id., 573 S.E.2d at 72-73 (citing Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 307, 486 S.E.2d
861, 870 (1997)).
368. 276 Ga. at 163, 575 S.E.2d at 467.
369. Id., 575 S.E.2d at 467-68.
370. 276 Ga. 434, 578 S.E.2d 426 (2003).
371. Id. at 438, 578 S.E.2d at 430-31.
372. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(e) (1993).
373. 276 Ga. at 447-49, 578 S.E.2d at 437-38 (Thompson, J., dissenting; Sears, J.,
dissenting in part).

212

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Practice Act 374 does not provide for computing time limits, this code
section can be appropriately supplemented by O.C.G.A. section 9-116. 3 " As Thomason's notice of cross-appeal was sent within the fifteenday period provided for by O.C.G.A. section 5-6-38(a) plus the three-day
extension provided for under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(e), the court held
376
that Thomason's cross-appeal was in fact timely.
X.

INEFFECTWVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

This section discusses ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict
of interest, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel at various stages
of a death penalty trial.
A.

Conflict of Interest

The court rejected appellant's argument in Wright v. State37 7 that
one of his two attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel due
to a conflict of interest.378 In explaining its determination, the court
noted that appellant's argument was based on the comments of a fellow
inmate represented by the attorney in question, and it cited appellant's
acknowledgement that both the challenged and the competent attorney
provided the same advice. 79
B.

Pretrial

Appellant in Hinely v. State8 ° alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel on the ground that his trial counsel did not properly communicate a pretrial plea offer to him. 1 At an independent hearing,
appellant testified that he received the plea offer and rejected it, and at
the hearing to address the plea, the court recessed to allow appellant to
speak with his attorneys about the offer before he rejected the plea.382
Citing these facts, the court found no evidence that appellant would have
accepted the offer had it been communicated differently and determined

374. O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-30 to -51 (1995).
375. 276 Ga. at 438, 578 S.E.2d at 431 (citing S. Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Goddard,
190 Ga. App. 97, 98, 378 S.E.2d 130, 131 (1989); Nat'l Consultants, Inc. v. Burt, 186 Ga.
App. 27, 366 S.E.2d 344 (1998)).
376. Id. at 438-39, 578 S.E.2d at 431.
377. 275 Ga. 497, 570 S.E.2d 280 (2002).
378. Id. at 498, 570 S.E.2d at 281-82.
379. Id.
380. 275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002).
381. Id. at 780, 573 S.E.2d at 71.
382. Id.
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that appellant
"fail[ed] to show any prejudice from the alleged er383
ror."
3 84
The court also rejected Thomason's claim in Head v. Thomason
that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea
bargaining process."'
Because it found that counsel had "actively
pursued opportunities" to seek a plea in spite of Thomason's "inconsistent reporting of the facts to counsel and his unwillingness to accept a
sentence of life without parole,"3 8 6 Thomason's claim of ineffectiveness
was defeated. 8 7
C.

Tial
In Thomason the court affirmed the habeas court's rejection of
Thomason's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advising him to
waive a jury trial. 38 8 Even though an incorrect assumption about the
judge's predisposition toward imposing the death penalty figured into
counsel's suggestion, the court stated that because counsel had multiple
reasons for giving the advice, the recommendation was a "strategic
decision" and not ineffectiveness. 8 9
Appellant in Hinely argued that his counsel was inadequately
prepared for the guilt-innocence phase of his trial.39 " Because appellant made no showing that an examination by a psychiatrist or
psychologist would have produced evidence with the potential to alter
the result of his trial, the court found against his claim that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in not making use of court-approved
funds for such an expert.39' Likewise, the court rejected appellant's
claims that counsel "did not fully pursue various pretrial motions and
failed to discuss the Unified Appeal Procedure with him"392 because
appellant did not make a showing of negative effects on his trial
outcome.39 3 Appellant's contention that counsel was ineffective in not
impeaching a witness based on a past conviction was similarly dismissed
by the court.3 ' First noting the presence of circumstances that would

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 780-81, 573 S.E.2d at 71.
276 Ga. 434, 578 S.E.2d 426 (2003).
Id. at 440, 578 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 439-40, 578 S.E.2d at 432.
Id.
Id. at 439, 578 S.E.2d at 431-32.
Id., 578 S.E.2d at 431.
275 Ga. at 781, 573 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 573 S.E.2d at 71-72.
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have procedurally barred counsel from performing such an impeachment,
the court explained that because the witness's own testimony made the
jury "fully aware of [the witness's] disreputable character,""' appellant's claim was defeated as "no reasonable probability exists that, but
for this error on trial counsel's part, the result of the proceeding would
have been any different." 96 During the direct testimony of appellant's
stepfather, the witness referred to appellant's previous incarceration.
Appellant's counsel declined the court's offer of a curative instruction,
reasoning that such a course might draw undue attention to the
comment, and on appeal appellant argued that this was ineffective
assistance.39 7
The court rejected appellant's claim, stating that
counsel's decision could have been one of "reasonable trial strategy."39
Further, the court added that any deficiency in counsel's lack of request
for a mistrial was without effect, explaining that because the trial court
determined that the witness's comment was nonresponsive, no mistrial
would have been granted.399
D. Jury Instructions
In Hinely the appellant also argued that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by making insufficient requests with respect to
jury instructions. 4 ' Noting that "no such issue was placed before the
jury, nor is there any evidence that it could have been,"4 1 the court
rejected appellant's complaint that counsel failed to request jury instructions on the law concerning impeachment by conviction of a crime of
moral turpitude. 4 2 The court also rejected appellant's complaint that
counsel did not request an instruction on the legal principle that
evidence put forth by an accomplice must be corroborated to support
conviction, explaining that because of the sizeable amount of evidence
corroborating the witness testimony in question, there was no reasonable
probability that the lack of such an instruction affected the trial's
outcome.4 °3

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id. (citing Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 793, 798, 499 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1998)).
Id.
Id. at 781-82, 573 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 782, 573 S.E.2d at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Sentencing

The court in Thomason found that appellant was afforded ineffective
assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial." 4
Pointing to counsel's erroneous assumption about the factfinder's
predisposition toward the death penalty and the presumed lack of
preparation for the sentencing phase that flowed from that assumption,
the court noted counsel's failure to present readily available mitigating
evidence and counsel's failure to call mitigating experts.4 5 Reviewing
these facts, the court found a "reasonable probability" that the presentation of the missing mitigation evidence would have changed the outcome
of Thomason's sentencing phase, and the court affirmed the habeas
court's grant of a new sentencing trial.40 6
In Hinely the court held no such reasonable probability and rejected
appellant's claim of ineffective assistance. 4 7 Though counsel testified
that he was not prepared for mitigation, the court found that appellant
failed to show that "had counsel prepared further for the sentencing
phase of the trial, any additional mitigation evidence would have been
disclosed that might have altered the outcome of his trial."4 °8
XI.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

A.

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania
In 1991 a jury convicted David Allen Sattazahn of first-degree murder
and other charges.4 9
When the jury deadlocked with regard to
Sattazahn's sentence, the judge, following Pennsylvania state law,
discharged the jury and sentenced Sattazahn to life imprisonment. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the conviction and sentence
because of improper jury instructions, and upon retrial, Sattazahn was
again convicted but sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and the death sentence,
rejecting petitioner's argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty
at Sattazahn's second trial.4 1 °

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

276 Ga. at 437-38, 578 S.E.2d at 430.
Id.
Id. at 438, 578 S.E.2d at 430.
275 Ga. at 782-83, 573 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. (citing Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783, 325 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1985)).
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
Id. at 103-04.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002, and in
an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority affirmed the decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.4 ' Stating that "an 'acquittal' at
a trial-like sentencing phase, rather than the mere imposition of a life
sentence, is required to give rise to double-jeopardy protections," 4 2 the
Court found that the judge's entry of a life sentence was not an
acquittal. 4" Because the judge had no discretion and was simply
complying with Pennsylvania state law, the Court held that the
"judgment [was] not based on findings which resolve[d] some factual
matter"4 14 and that "it [was] not sufficient to establish legal entitlement to a life sentence."41 Such a legal entitlement to a life sentence
is only established through sufficient factual findings, such as the State
failing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt aggravating circumstances
necessary to impose death. 4 6 As Sattazahn's original sentence was not
an "acquittal" under this standard, the Court's majority found that the
default judgment did not trigger a Fifth Amendment double jeopardy bar
to a death sentence upon retrial. 417
The Court's majority similarly rejected Sattazahn's Fourteenth
Amendment claim that his capital resentencing violated his due process
rights by depriving him of the life and liberty interests he had secured
through his original statutorily mandated life sentence. 418 Because
"[Sattazahn]'s due-process claim [was] nothing more than his doublejeopardy claim in different clothing,"419 the majority found no due
process violation.4 2 °
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer, argued that the analysis of the petitioner's double jeopardy
claim turns on "whether a final judgment so entered qualifie[d] as a
jeopardy-terminating event,"421 not whether there was an "acquit42 3
tal."422 Pointing to the Court's reasoning in United States v. Scott,

411. Id. at 116.
412. Id. at 107 (citing Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981)).
413. Id. at 109.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 109-10.
418. Id. at 115.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421.
422. Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
423. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). In Scott, the court stated:
[The] defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings
against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of
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Justice Ginsburg argued that a "trial-terminating judgment for life, not
prompted by a procedural move on the defendant's part, creates a legal
entitlement protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause."4 24 Separate
from any extension of Scott's logic to the instant case, the dissent found
that "the perils against which the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to
protect are plainly implicated by the prospect of a second capital
sentencing proceeding."4 25 By subjecting Sattazahn to another death
trial, Sattazahn would be forced to live in a "continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity."42 8 Explaining that the majority's decision wrongly
forces a defendant in Sattazahn's position to "relinquish either her right
to file a potentially meritorious appeal, or her state-granted entitlement
to avoid the death penalty,"4 27 and that the potential for a death
sentence upon retrial heightened Sattazahn's double jeopardy interest,
the dissent "would hold that jeopardy terminated as to42Sattazahn's
8
sentence after the judge entered a final judgment for life."
B.

Miller-El v.Cockrell

In petitioner's 1986 capital murder trial, the Dallas County assistant
district attorneys used peremptory strikes to exclude ten of the eleven
eligible African-American potential jurors. 429 The trial judge denied
petitioner's motion to strike the jury, and petitioner was subsequently
found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, petitioner
claimed that these jury selection procedures violated the Equal
Protection Clause and the United States Supreme Court's holding in
The United States District Court for the
Batson v. Kentucky." °
Northern District of Texas found that petitioner had not established a

which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy
Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial
court in favor of the defendant ....[Tihe Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards
against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.
Id. at 98-99.
424. 537 U.S. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
425. Id.
426. Id. (quoting Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
427.
428. Id. at 127.
429. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
430. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing a three-part process for determining whether a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause: (1) The
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was based on
race; (2) The prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each such strike; and (3) The
court must consider all of this evidence to decipher whether the defendant has shown
purposeful discrimination).
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constitutional violation warranting habeas relief, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied petitioner a certificate of
appealability (C.O.A.) from the district court's decision.4 31 On review
of this denial, the United States Supreme Court held that the
court of
2
appeals erred and that the C.O.A. should have been issued.1
Reviewing the record, the Court found that the district court "did not
give full consideration to the substantial evidence petitioner put forth in
support of the prima facie case [of racially discriminatory policies]" 433
and placed too demanding a standard on petitioner by incorrectly
requiring a showing that the state court decision was "objectively
unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence." 4 ' The Court further
held that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to "resolve the
merits of petitioner's constitutional claims" 435 as it attempted to
do. 4 6 Rather, because the question before the court of appeals was
"the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the
resolution of that debate,"" 7 the court of appeals was only to inquire
whether "a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional
439
right"438 was proven in order to grant a C.O.A.
In support of his Batson claim to the state and federal courts that
denied him relief, petitioner presented evidence of "a pattern and
practice of race discrimination"" 0 by the district attorney's office and
evidence of prosecutorial conduct that included a disproportionate
peremptory strike rate on African American jurors, racially disparate
modes of jury examination, and use of jury shuffling in response to the
racial seating pattern in particular jury panels."' Citing the strength
of this evidence, the Court found that the trial court did not adequately
scrutinize the credibility of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons in
resolving petitioner's Batson challenge." 2 The Court emphasized that
petitioner's historical evidence of racial discrimination by the district
attorney's office was relevant to the Batson inquiry because it "casts
doubt on the legitimacy of the motives underlying the State's actions in

431. 537 U.S. 326-27
432. Id.
433. Id. at 341.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 342.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 331.
441. Id. at 331-35.
442. Id. at 341.
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petitioner's case"' and speaks to the issue of purposeful discrimination.444 Finding that petitioner clearly met the standard of the C.O.A.
inquiry by showing that the district court's determination was debatable,
the Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. 445
C.

Sell v. United States

Petitioner in Sell 6 was forced to take antipsychotic medication at
a medical center for federal prisoners to render him competent to stand
trial on fraud and attempted murder charges." 7 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Eighth
Circuit erred in rejecting Sell's argument that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to render him competent for trial on nonviolent charges was a violation of his Fifth Amendment guarantee of
liberty.44 In addressing whether the forced administration of medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial was a violation of his
449
Fifth Amendment rights, the Court relied on Washington v. Harper
and Riggins v. Nevada450 and concluded that:
[Tihe Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal
charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but
only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely
to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and,
taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly
45 1
to further important governmental trial-related interests.
Operating under the assumption that Sell was not dangerous, the
Court applied this newly articulated standard and found that the court
of appeals erred in allowing the forced administration of antipsychotic
medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial.452 Previous
adjudication of Sell's forced medication focused on questions of Sell's
dangerousness, so the court did not address "trial-related side effects and
risks,"453 such as "[w]hether a particular drug will tend to sedate a

443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. at 347.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
Id. at 2179-80.
Id. at 2181.
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
504 U.S. 127 (1992).
123 S. Ct. at 2184.
Id. at 2187.
Id.
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defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, prevent rapid
reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to express
emotions."4 54 Without information on these issues, which are central
to determining the acceptability of medication to restore competence, the
Court could not determine whether Sell's fair trial rights were undermined.4 55 Without such answers and because of the Court's finding of
a moderated governmental interest in prosecuting Sell due to his already
lengthy confinement, the Court vacated the judgment of the Eighth
Circuit and remanded the case.456
D.

Wiggins v. Smith

Petitioner in Wiggins4 57 was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death in Maryland in 1989. Though Wiggins's two public defenders did
some limited investigation into his background and were aware of some
of the severe abuse Wiggins suffered as a youth, defense counsel did not
present any of this mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase of
Wiggins's trial. Defense counsel instead continued to focus on disproving
Wiggins's direct responsibility for the murder in question. Wiggins
challenged the adequacy of his representation at sentencing, and after
receiving no relief in Maryland's state courts, Wiggins filed a petition for
federal writ of habeas corpus in 2001. Whereas the Maryland Court of
Appeals found defense counsel's decision to focus on retrying the factual
elements of the case instead of presenting mitigating evidence one of
reasonable strategy, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland rejected this argument and granted Wiggins relief.45 The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the
limited investigation conducted by defense counsel into Wiggins's
difficult history was sufficient to render their approach at the sentencing
phase of the trial an "informed strategic choice."459 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002 and subsequently reversed the
decision of the Fourth Circuit and remanded petitioner's case."
Citing the standard for determinations of ineffective assistance of
counsel articulated by the Court in Strickland v. Washington,"6

454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
458. Id. at 2532-34.
459. Id. at 2534 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 641 (4th Cir. 2002)).
460. Id. at 2544.
461. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance, a petitioner must first show
that counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating that the representation "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness," and then must show that this deficiency
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, emphasized that the Court's
inquiry into petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim would not revolve
around whether counsel should have presented mitigating evidence.462
Rather, the Court's determination was driven by "whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence
of Wiggins's background was itself reasonable,"4" using a standard of
"reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."4"
Not only did counsel's decision not to investigate Wiggin's social
history beyond two brief written reports fall below the standard practice
in Maryland capital cases and the standards articulated by the American
Bar Association, the majority found that "the scope of their investigation
was also unreasonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the
[social services] records."4 5 In reviewing the rest of the trial record,
the Court concluded that the limited investigation "was the result of
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment,"4"" and found that
defense counsel's investigation did not meet the performance standards
of Strickland.467 The Court further found that the mitigating evidence
defense counsel failed to uncover and present to the jury "'might well
have influenced the jury's appraisal' of Wiggins'[s] moral culpability."468 Because of the Court's finding of prejudice as a result of
counsel's deficient performance, the majority held that Wiggins's defense
counsel had in fact rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the
Sixth Amendment.4 69

prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88.
462. 123 S. Ct. at 2541.
463. Id. at 2536.
464. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
465. Id. at 2536-37.
466. Id. at 2541-42.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 2544 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000)).
469. Id.
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